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In the principal case, the statute was construed to grant the
privilege to public judicial proceedings, since any other construction
would defeat the public policy behind the statute. The privilege is
thereby denied whenever the proceedings have been made private
by court rules sealing the record.
Although the decision is sufficiently broad to encompass other
sealed matter,17 nevertheless, it may be limited to the specific type
of matter here involved, that is, filed pleadings in matrimonial actions. The rule, as a practical matter, should not be extended to
cover sealed testimony. The latter conclusion is supported by the
distinct legal histories,' 8 public policies and practical considerations
attending testimony and filed pleadings.
Viewed practically, the decision would curtail undesirable newspaper sensationalism, which in turn would implement the protection
of public morals, especially of young and impressionable adolescents.
A further result of this case will be the protection of the reputation
of those so often falsely accused as correspondents in matrimonial
actions.

TORTS -

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR ILLEGAL

AcTs

OF THIRD

PARTIES.-Plaintiff sued on a negligence theory to recover damages

for injuries caused by fireworks illegally discharged ' by invitees in
defendant-municipality's park. Defendant's employees had previously seen, but had not stopped, similar fireworks. Although an admission fee was normally charged, none was required at the time of
the injury, nor were the above-mentioned employees present. The
and . . . relief was awarded . . . ." Whereas in the Stevenson case ". . . the
published report was the contents of the affidavit of the plaintiff . . . made in
support of a motion .... The affidavit and notice of motion were served and
filed in court. No opposition papers were served or filed and the motion was
never submitted or argued but was withdrawn." Id. at 288. Judgment was
rendered for the defendant, the court holding that Rule 278 did not take away
the privilege.
17 As, for example, the records and documents relating to the admission or
discipline of attorneys, or for the confinement of the mentally ill. N. Y. JUD.
LAW §90(10); N. Y. MEN. HYG. LAW §74(6).
IsWith the exception of a few early cases, the courts have consistently
recognized the applicability of the privilege to reports of testimony. Only
recently have merely-filed pleadings come within the scope of the privilege.
Moreover, to extend the rule to include sealed testimony would appear to be
a futile act in view of the fact that spectators are often allowed to witness the
testimony as it is given. Thus they could disseminate what the court had
sealed.
1iN. Y. PENAL LAW § 1894(a) (2).
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trial court's decision for plaintiff was reversed on the law by the
Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals reversed, and held: A
municipality is liable for injuries sustained as a result of patently
dangerous and criminal acts of third parties within a public park if
it has actual or constructive notice of these acts and their probable
continuance. Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N. Y. 263, 107
N. E. 2d 441 (1952).
In the maintenance and supervision of public parks, a city performs a corporate or quasi-private function. 2 Where an admission
fee is charged, there is no doubt that the operation of the park is a
private and profit-making enterprise, and liability will be imposed for
negligent acts of the city.3 It would appear, however, from dicta in
the case of Whittaker v. Franklinville,4 that where the negligent act
is one of omission r and no entrance fee is charged at any time, the
governmental immunity rule would apply and protect the city from
liability.
The city is not an insurer of the safety of those who use its
parks, 6 but a duty devolves upon it to exercise ordinary care.7

In

this respect, it is liable in the same degree and on the same basis as
individuals or private corporations.8 Liability is readily imposed for
injuries resulting from defective equipment or facilities,9 or from
failure adequately to protect against unsafe conditions existing in the
park and likely to be a menace to human safety.'0

2 Cf. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928);
see also
Note, 142 A. L. R. 1340, 1350 (1943).
3
Augustine v. Town of Brant, supra note 2.
4265 N. Y. 11, 17, 191 N. E. 716, 719 (1934).
5 N. Y. CouRT or CLAIms AcT § 8. The state's waiver of immunity under
this Act has been interpreted by the courts to exclude liability for negligent
acts of omission if the function is governmental rather than corporate. See
Note, 24 N. Y. U. L. Q. RE-v. 38 (1949).
6 See Clark v. Buffalo, 288 N. Y. 62, 65, 41 N. E. 2d 459, 460 (1942);
Curcio v. City of New York, 275 N. Y. 20, 23, 9 N. E. 2d 760, 762 (1937);
Scala v. City of New York, 200 Misc. 475, 480, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 790, 795
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
7 Rafsky v. City of New York, 257 App. Div. 855, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 560
(2d Dep't 1939) ; cf. Curcio v. City of New York, mtpra note 6; see Collentine
v. City of New York, 279 N. Y. 119, 17 N. E, 2d 792 (1939).
8 See Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 539 (N. Y. 1842);
Honaman v. Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535, 185 Atl. 750, 751 (1936).
9 See Collentine v. City of New York, supra note 7 (iron bar protruding
from roof frequented by children); Warner v. Albany, 262 App. Div. 677,
31 N. Y. S. 2d 75 (3d Dep't 1941) (faulty park bench); McMahon v. Buffalo,
257 App. Div. 916, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 116 (4th Dep't 1939) (broken bottle embedded in park path).
10 See Clayton v. Niagara Falls, 252 N. Y. 595, 170 N. E. 2d 156 (1930)
(failure to guard hole in ice); Fedearowicz v. Amsterdam, 293 N. Y. 814,
59 N. E. 2d 178 (1944) (failure to warn against danger of using pool) ; Riggi
v. Village of Le Roy, 301 N. Y. 735, 95 N. E. 2d 410 (1950) (failure to
guard playground apparatus when supervision was suspended).
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However, when the injuries suffered result from the acts of
third persons invited into the park, it is more difficult to decide
whether or not the city is liable. Because of the great difficulty in
anticipating the actions of park visitors, liability will not be imposed
upon a municipality unless it could have foreseen the dangerous act
and consequently provided against it." Likewise, the city will be
absolved if it 1does
not have actual or constructive notice in time to
2
prevent harm.
In Greinerv. Syracuse,'3 the city was released from liability for
injury resulting from an unlawful explosion in a public street. Two
hours notice to policemen was held insufficient notice to the city.
Since this occurrence was not an habitual and continuous invasion
of the public right, but merely an "isolated trespass," the city could
not be held to have received actual or constructive notice.
In a subsequent New York case, Fritz v. Buffalo,14 plaintiff recovered for injuries received as a result of boisterous activities of
third parties on the ice-skating facilities of a public park. The question of notice was not discussed. The only question submitted to the
jury was whether the injury resulted from inadequate supervision.
Apparently, however, the city had foreseen that such rough and dangerous activities might take place, for it had acted by employing
guards to watch for and prevent just such activities. It is probable
that had the city provided adequate supervision, it would have been
relieved from liability if an injury occurred. 1
In the present case, the dangerous activities engaged in at the
beach park, cannot be classed as "habitual or continuous invasions
of the public right" under the rule in Greiner v. Syracuse, supra,
inasmuch as they occurred on but two consecutive days before the
injury. Nor is it probable that the city foresaw these actions, as it
had in the Fritz case, for it took no precautions against them. It
therefore seems to follow that the present case represents a lessening
of the notice requirement and an increased burden of foreseeability
upon the city.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the municipality would have
escaped liability on the theory of governmental immunity.' 6 In the
"1Clark v. Buffalo, 288 N. Y. 62, 41 N. E. 2d 459 (1942)

(child threw

glass at plaintiff); Mandelowitz v. City of New York, 277 App. Div. 1134,
101 N. Y. S. 2d 166 (2d Dep't 1950) (boys in playground threw cardboard
spools); Laub v. City of New York, 271 App. Div. 797, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 261
(2d Dep't 1946) (observer of handball game knocked down by tricycle).
12 Cf. Greiner v. Syracuse, 228 App. Div. 566, 241 N. Y. Supp. 313 (4th
Dep't 1930), aff'd nmer., 256 N. Y. 688, 177 N. E. 194 (1931); see Bauman
v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. App. 2d 144, 108 P. 2d 989, 996 (1940) (notice to
employee insufficient).
1s

Greiner v. Syracuse, supra note 12.

14277

only).
15

8

1

N. Y. 710, 14 N. E. 2d 815 (1938)

(facts appear in unofficial reporter

Cf. Peterson v. City of New York, 267 N. Y. 204, 196 N. E. 27 (1935).
See Note, 142 A. L. R. 1340, 1342 (1943).
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present case, however, the Court of Appeals accepts as wellestablished the principle that whether or not the park is operated for
a profit, the city is acting in a quasi-private or corporate capacity.
This seems to limit the force of the dictum in the Whittaker case,
since liability was imposed despite the fact that no entrance fees were
charged at the time the injury occurred.
It appears from this opinion that the court broadened the scope
of municipal liability to what is perhaps an unreasonable degree. 17
This decision follows a noticeable, though unfortunate, trend toward
an extension of municipal tort liability 8s-unfortunate, since it may
result in discouraging small and impecunious municipalities from
providing recreational facilities. With the tendency toward a decrease in governmental immunity, the ultimate burden upon the taxpayers will be increased, since they will 1ay not only for the supervision of parks, but also for injuries resulting from a lack of it.

M
ToRTs-REs IPSA LOQUITUR-EXPLODING BEVERAGE BOTTLE.Plaintiff was injured when a beer bottle, which she had selected from
a shelf in defendant's self-service store, exploded in her hands. In
an action to recover damages, plaintiff alleged breach of warranty
and negligence. The Appellate Division, reversing a dismissal of
the complaint, held that an inference of negligence arises when a customer is injured by the unexpected dangerous behavior of an article
which was hitherto in the exclusive possession of a store owner.
Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 436
(3d Dep't 1952).
Actions for damages for injuries caused by exploding bottles
are generally based either on breach of implied warranty or on negligence. The implied warranties-merchantability 1 and fitness for
use 2-- arise only after there has been a contract of sale or transfer
4
of title,3 and may be enforced only by those in privity of contract.
'1 See Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N. Y. 268, 276, 107 N. E. 2d
441, 445 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
is See Duren v. City of Binghamton, 172 Misc. 580, 583, 15 N. Y. S. 2d
518, 521 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 694, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (3d
Dep't), affd, 283 N. Y. 467, 28 N. E. 2d 918 (1940) ; see Note, 23 ST. JoHN's
L. Rxv. 117 (1948).
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96(2). "Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be
the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the
goods2 shall be of merchantable quality." UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2).
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96(1). "Where the buyer, expressly or by
implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or
judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(1).

3 Bunday v. Columbus Machine Co., 143 Mich. 10. 106 N. W. 397 (1906);
Steams v. Drake, 24 P. I. 272, 52 Atl. 1082 (1902) ; Naumann v. Wehle Brew-

